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1. Introduction 
 
For a long time International Business topics of absolute, relative and competitive advantage 
have triggered political scientists, economists and social scientists to explore theories to 
understand the what, how and why questions of international trade, multinational enterprises 
and globalization. The field of International Business has always combined theoretical 
concepts from many disciplines. Phenomena and problems in International Business ask for 
tools to explain and solve them. Within the tension between different legal, political, cultural, 
organizational, economic and managerial systems, decision-making between individuals, 
groups, companies and countries plays a crucial role in International Business. This means 
that in a complex decision-making scenario, International Business research needs to draw 
upon tools which explain, analyze and solve these strategic interactions. In this article, we 
make the case for such a theoretical tool to analyze cooperation and conflict in International 
Business – Game Theory. 
 
Game Theory cannot simply be viewed as a matter of abstract mathematics, 
but as fundamentally concerning the real world (Rubinstein, 1991).  
 
Rubinstein’s statement indicates that Game Theory is an abstract inquiry into the function and 
logic of social institutions and patterns of behavior. Game Theory offers a strategic tool to 
look forwards by reasoning backwards which can be very useful for decision-makers in multi-
person decision-making situations like those in International Business. Schelling (1960) 
showed as much in the Strategy of Conflict a rational analysis of international political 
conflict – as did Axelrod (1984) in the Evolution of Co-operation, which showed how 
cooperation can emerge in a world of self-interested egoists (superpowers, businesses and 
individuals) without central authority to police action. Both conflict and co-operation are 
crucial parts of Game Theory and the strategic treatment of decision-making situations has 
contributed to a better understanding of behavior in social, political and economic settings. 
Though Game Theory is mostly equated to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this paper shows the 
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potential of the solution concepts to analyze dynamics and uncertainty as well. The analysis 
of International Business problems and challenges, such as MNEs in emerging markets, can 
usefully import knowledge from other disciplines and then export the new insights gained 
from the applications to IB problems. 
 
This paper shows the strength of Game Theory for considering international business 
problems. It starts with the chronology, explanations, notations and reasoning of Game 
Theory and reviews the applications of Game Theory to International Business. To 
understand the use of Game Theory for International Business, strength and weaknesses are 
presented in the framework of analysis to deal with the criticism often put forward against 
Game Theory. The contribution of this paper is that it connects the future IB research agenda 
suggested by IB scholars with the strength of a game theoretical approach as a mode of 
analysis. In the mathematical appendix the reader will find a formal example to support the 
argument for IB and Game Theory.  
 
2. Game Theory and International Business  
 
2.1. Game Theory – Chronology, Explanations and Notations 
 
This section introduces the works of game theory and the basic notation and rules of the 
games as well as the solution concepts offered. The starting point for the development of 
Game Theory was the publication of John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern’s seminal 
work ‘The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior’ in 1944. Subsequently, Economics and 
Political Science have been the main fields in which Game Theory has been applied and 
developed. Game Theorists became Nobel Laureates for Economics in 1994 (John Nash, 
Reinhard Selten and John Harsanyi), 1996 (James Mirrlees, William Vickrey), 2001 (George 
Akerlof, Michael Spence, Joseph Stiglitz), 2005 (Robert Aumann, Thomas Schelling), and 
2007 (Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson). By contrast, Game Theory has not 
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been widely used in the field of Business. Camerer (1991) argued that the field of Strategic 
Management was considerably impaired by the way in which Game Theory had been 
marginalized within that field. In this paper, we take Camerer’s (1991) general approach, 
develop it, and apply it to the specific field of International Business. 
 
2.1.1. Games - Notation 
 
Game Theory can be divided into Co-operative and Non-cooperative Game Theory. The 
former is important in the context of coalitions and political science of voting. The latter has 
been necessary to examine static and dynamic games and games played with complete or 
incomplete information - chess or poker, for instance. Table 1 shows the relevant solution 
concepts in this context in a 2 x 2 table formed by the dimensions of time and information. 
 
Game Theory has been widely defined as the study of mathematical models of cooperation 
and conflict (Myerson, 1991). A game, Γ, in game theoretical terms, is any social situation of 
two or more individuals who are called players (N). These players are assumed to be rational 
and intelligent. A decision-maker is rational when she makes decisions consistently in pursuit 
of her own objectives. The players choose strategies, iC ,
 and their choice of strategies yields 
payoffs to each player (possibly random). In Game Theory, ‘strategy’ means the actions of 
the players.  The term, ‘strategy’, should not be confused with the use of it in strategic 
management. Each player’s objective is to maximize the expected value of her own payoff, 
which is measured in utility scale iu . The basic model of a game is, therefore, 
))(,)(,( NiiNii uCN  .  
 
Camerer’s (1991) explication of the utility of Game Theory for Strategic Management 
Research distinguishes between games, game theoretic reasoning and equilibrium points 
which are determined by game-theoretic reasoning. He used Cournot quantity-setting and the 
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centipede game as examples and dispelled a common myth that players who do not reason 
game theoretically will never converge to an equilibrium and another myth that players must 
think they are rational ad infinitum. When he suggested that game theory provides a 
taxonomy of interactive situations, it becomes clear that not only strategy research, but also 
International Business can benefit from using strategic formulation situations. He suggested 
the benefits of becoming familiar with the terms of game theory such as equilibrium, pooling 
and separating, rationalizability, reputation, folk theorem, coordination games, trigger 
strategies, learning curve, strategic groups, entry barriers and scope and scale economies (see 
glossary). A lot of these terms and concepts are used in International Business as well and 
merging them seems a useful way forward.  
 
2.1.2. Game Theoretic Reasoning 
 
We use Camerer’s (1991) approach to look into game theoretic reasoning. Game theoretic 
reasoning is expressed in the decision rule or algorithm which selects the equilibrium 
strategy. Camerer used the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to show the quantity setting process of 
reasoning and the Centipede game to show the moves of the players and the algorithm which 
starts at the last possible move and works forward. This is seen as looking forwards and 
reasoning backwards – backward induction. Camerer mainly focused on Cournot and 
Centipede games, but there are many more equilibrium concepts, such as Bertrand Nash 
equilibrium (price setting equilibrium), Stackelberg equilibrium (leader-follower situation), 
Sub-Game Perfect equilibrium (sequential moves), Bayesian Nash equilibrium (uncertainty 
and simultaneous moves), Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (uncertainty and dynamic updating 
of beliefs). 
 
2.1.3. Equilibrium Analysis 
 
6 
 
The equilibrium analysis deals with the discovery and analysis of equilibrium points 
(Camerer 1991). He rebutted the criticism and dispelled the myths about equilibrium analysis: 
Firstly, game theoretic reasoning is only one of several kinds of equilibrating forces to 
converge to an equilibrium. Secondly, players do not necessarily think that others are rational 
and think others think they are rational, since there is much less rationality needed for some 
games to be solved. Camerer (1991) emphasized that game theoretic reasoning is a kind of 
cognitive tatonnement, and the following forces might similarly produce equilibration in 
games: introspection, communication, adaptation and evolution.  
 
2.1.4. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Beyond 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma goes back to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Nash 
(1950) with around 1000 articles written about it in the 50s and 60s (Donninger, 1986). It was 
made popular to the social sciences with Axelrod (1986) with alone 209 articles based on it in 
the 80s and 90s (Axelrod and D’Ambrosio, 1995). Whenever game theory is mentioned, the 
first connection made is with the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Nash Equilibrium. The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is the dilemma between self-interest and co-operation or altruism. 
Camerer (1991) gave as an example for such a Prisoner’s Dilemma application in strategy 
that firms need to decide whether to maintain high prices or low production amounts in a 
cartel. It is clear that in a single play the rational self-interested players should defect, as this 
is a dominant strategy and it makes no difference whether the other player is rational or not. 
There have been many new approaches and angles to the Prisoner’s Dilemma recently, in 
particular repetition, reputation and monitoring (Bhaskar & Obara, 2002; Mailath & Morris, 
2006; Piccione, 2002). Graham (2003) showed in his paper the rationale behind the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma for an IB audience using an MNE perspective. 
 
We develop Camerer’s approach by adding to his basic model a dynamic dimension, with 
time (t). This allows us to move from static to dynamic games. Furthermore, we add an 
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information dimension, with a dummy player, called Nature, or a randomization of types, 
with probabilities (p). This means we can show key equilibrium concepts beyond the famous 
Nash Equilibrium, made with regard to the problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In addition to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, table 1 outlines the three key equilibrium concepts developed to 
attend to the time and information dimensions - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium and the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967-8; Selten, 1975).  
 
********** 
Insert Table 1: Static and Dynamic Games of Complete and Incomplete Information 
********** 
 
2.2. International Business Research - The Application of Game Theory to International 
Business 
 
We are now in the position to examine how far Game Theory has been applied within the 
International Business literature. Game Theoretic contributions to the field have been few. 
Table 2 positions the game theoretical IB literature into the Prisoner’s Dilemma and beyond.  
 
************* 
Insert Table 2: Situating International Business Applications of Game Theory against Key 
Equilibrium Concepts 
************* 
 
The following paragraphs use the game theoretical International Business literature to show 
the strength of this approach and align it with the equilibrium concepts of Table 1.  
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma as static complete information game. Graham (1998) considered market 
structure and the role of MNEs by using a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation and showed the 
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oligopoly situation in a game theoretical model. He uses game theory to show important 
insights into why MNEs of significant are occurring in markets. His explanation elaborates 
about the first movers in a market and that players do not necessarily need to be low cost 
sellers to become MNEs. Many advantages of an MNE lead to it being a first mover, which 
can be more connected to its efforts to keep its rival away than its reaction to the advantages 
which overall entails FDIs. Graham stressed that game theory can be a very rich supplement 
to transaction costs to theorize phenomena in the world which are observed, but not well 
explained. His suggestion for applying game theory to MNEs is strong, as it shows that game 
theory deserves to be more appreciated in International Business. 
 
Dynamic complete information game. Casson (1994) outlines in The Economics of Business 
Culture an important research agenda centring on a rigorous treatment of culture. Although he 
contrasts his approach with transaction cost and Game Theory, his approach can be 
understood as a particular form of game theorizing. He argues that Game Theory assumes 
contracts as unenforceable and therefore relates models of Game Theory with international 
relations topics in which there is no supranational authority capable of enforcing contracts. He 
postulates and offers a model of a follower-leader relationship for business culture 
relationships. In game theoretic equilibrium concept terms, this is an example of a 
Stackelberg equilibrium which is based on a dynamic perfect information setting. Agmon 
(2003) developed a stylized game theoretic model in order to gain insights into the income 
distributional effects of the globalization process. He emphasized the bargaining situation 
between national states, which are trying to generate more welfare for their residents, and 
MNEs which are trying to maximize their value. The author applied the model to the case of 
Israel and Intel. This shows a clear applicability of game theory to MNE and government 
relationships. Similarly, Luo (2004) analyzed a game theoretical application to international 
business topics such as MNEs, their relationship with governments and general international 
alliance issues with a cooperation and competition perspective. His book Co-opetition in 
International Business is based on Brandenburger and Nalebuff’s (1996) Co-opetition. Sanna-
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Randaccio and Veugelers (2007) used a game theoretical approach to analyze MNE 
knowledge spillovers and analyzed it from an industrial organization perspective with a 
mathematical treatment of strategic interactions.  
 
Static incomplete information games. Ott (2006) considered an international joint venture 
game for the various stages of an IJV life cycle and applied game theoretical refinements 
(information economics, common agency, repeated games) to the different problems of 
incomplete information in IJVs. Her work was based on a logical mathematical treatment of 
IJVs, Ott (2006) shows that moral hazard and adverse selection problems can be approached 
by offering incentive compatible contracts for the different strategic archetypes of IJV 
configurations in a special common agency game.  
 
Dynamic incomplete information games. Adding a dynamic perspective to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation of MNEs and their HQ and subsidiary relationships, Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2002) show a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the two players’ iterated 
choice regarding control and cheating – a repeated moral hazard scenario. The logical 
analysis of the problem followed a case study. Ott (2006) added, as well, a dynamic 
incomplete information dimension to the adverse selection and moral hazard in the form of 
signaling and repeated moral hazard contracts for the strategic archetypes of IJVs.  
 
Cooperative Games.  The games applied to International Business above are more or less 
non-cooperative games. Rao and Reddy (1996) used game theory to analyze coalitions in 
strategic alliances and joint ventures. They show the strength of game theory to model 
problems of binding agreements and how coalitions are formed in alliances. The authors 
added a dynamic analysis to the basic game theoretical approach. Similarly, Ott (2006) chose 
a combination of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in her common agency 
analysis.  
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These applications to topics of international business and the respective equilibrium concepts 
are useful to clarify that the game theoretical analysis includes many more facets than a static, 
simultaneous move game like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. It makes a strong statement 
about the strength of game theory as a set of methods and a way of gaining insights into the 
complexities, patterns and interactions in international endeavors. It shows, as all the authors 
above pointed out, that game theory has been so far overlooked as a theoretical tool which can 
generate hypotheses to be tested with data from a ‘real life’ context. 
 
2.3. Strength and Weaknesses of Game Theory for International Business  
 
The applications of game theory to international business show a clear research agenda and 
the possibility to use a structured, strategic and robust approach to problems in MNEs, 
between MNEs and governments, market access, international collaborations and cultural 
communication. By applying game theory to IB problems, these authors speak in a clear voice 
about the strength of game theory for International Business. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
examine criticisms of Game Theory. This process may help to clarify some common areas of 
misconceptions.  
 
This section starts with the weaknesses of Game Theory identified for Strategic Management 
by Ghemawat (1997) and Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991, pp. 18–22), transfers them into 
strengths and shows how International Business can circumvent them with the knowledge and 
techniques we now possess. We take their criticisms and show the response from Camerer 
(1991) and other authors in game theory, industrial organization and economics. We add an 
International Business perspective to it and connect it to the previously shown equilibrium 
concepts in order to show the strength of Game Theory for International Business. 
 
Criticism 1. Knowledge about the strategic phenomena to be studied is outside the scope of 
Game Theory and game theorists are generally unwilling to learn much about business, 
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leaving a leading role for scholars (presumed to be strategists) who identify phenomena 
worth studying. Relating this criticism to International Business, there can be a concern that 
game theorists do not have the knowledge about phenomena of International Business. This is 
a weak point. Just because game theorists have not looked at International Business it does 
not follow that International Business should not look at Game Theory. A dialogue between 
these two areas should be started and one useful way of to do this would be for International 
Business to grow our own International Business scholars with Game Theory knowledge. 
Camerer (1991) showed how game theoretical reasoning and the concern about its use in 
strategic management can be brushed off by a chopstick analogy in which students and 
scholars can use the reasoning techniques. The assumption that game theoretic models are too 
hard to use can be overcome by education, practice and even software.  
 
Criticism 2. Game-theoretic analyses focus on explaining the possible existence of interactive 
effects rather than assaying their practical importance, which hurts predictive power. 
Camerer (1991) argues in favor of game theory and emphasized that it answers questions 
managers should want to know the answers to, and it should be part of a sensible package of 
advice. The best advice will come from an empirically-grounded ‘behavioral game theory’ 
that tells them how others are likely to behave. It needs to be emphasized that International 
Business phenomena often deal with multi-person decision-making problems and Game 
Theory would offer appropriate solution concepts for dealing with these real-life topics. This 
would lead to much stronger predictive power of strategic international interactions (in MNEs 
and between countries). Finally, we would like to point to the application of game theory to 
auctions as a good example of its applicability to practical issues and its predictive power.  
 
Criticism 3. Game-theorists model strategic phenomena piecemeal, in a way that focuses on a 
minimal number of economic variables to the exclusion of others – psychology, political, 
organizational, technological, and even economic – which limits both scientific testability and 
practical utility. This critique considers the problem of using a minimal number of variables 
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and neglecting those with a political, psychological and technological dimension. The 
appropriate response is that it depends on the skills of the Game Theory modeler to integrate 
parameters which can capture political, economic, technological, psychological and cultural 
factors. These variables would need to be positioned as measures and could easily be 
integrated in models as corollaries or lemmas. Rubinstein (1991) even suggested how to 
integrate psychological factors into game theoretical models. This could be done as part of the 
modeling or by introducing a machine which would feed back the choices of the players 
(Myerson,1991). In the next section we suggest adding the above-mentioned factors into 
game theoretical models in an elegant way.  
 
Criticism 4. Game-theoretic equilibrium may be an unreasonable outcome to expect to 
observe in practice because of the information and the degree of rationality required to get 
there. The information argument here can easily be countered. Above, we have already shown 
that Game Theory allows for incomplete information. Furthermore, there have already been 
models of bounded rationality in Game Theory (Arthur, 1994; Rubinstein, 1998; Gigerenzer 
and Selten, 2002, Gintis, 2009). Camerer (1991, 149) emphasized that the criticism of game 
theory as assuming too much  rationality of players is often misguided because strong  
rationality assumptions are not  always needed, and equilibrium analysis could be worth 
doing because even bounded-rational players can reach an equilibrium by adaptation or other 
mechanisms. Gintis (2009) clearly pointed out in his analysis of the scientific status of the 
rational actor model that the archetypal rational actor model is an abstraction from individual 
choice behavior. First, he stressed that preferences are a function of the current state of the 
actor, and an ever changing developmental history. He also pointed out that the subjective 
prior is a function of beliefs which are socially constructed and dependent on cultural 
experience and social interaction and that preferences are affected by moral considerations 
that are situationally specific. ‘Recognizing these dimensions of rational action dramatically 
complicates the analytical representation of rational action, but there is no alternative, if one’s 
aim is the explanation of human behavior’ (Gintis, 2009). Modeling human behavior in the 
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context of cultural backgrounds is important for International Business and an evolutionary 
game theoretical approach would be a useful tool to improve our understanding of human 
interactions in an international contents. The criticism is thus dispelled by showing research 
potential for Game Theory in this area.  
 
Criticism 5. While game-theoretic models of industrial organization focus on external 
interactions, the roots of competitive advantage may be internal. This critique, which is 
concerned about the lack of internal focus in game theoretical literature, can be dismissed 
because the Industrial Organization literature has already dealt with internal and external 
interactions. Saloner (1991) strongly argued that game theoretic models had had a tremendous 
impact on empirical research in industrial organization and held out similar prospects for 
strategic management. He suggested that game theory plays two different roles in empirical 
work: a) in developing and refining hypotheses for reduced form empirical models in which 
the specific structural characteristics of the models are not used, but an empirical 
investigation examines whether the data are consistent and b) in generating and testing 
structural models. Bresnahan and Schmalensee (1987) even wrote that the game theoretical 
developments produced a rich set of hypotheses and a powerful set of modeling techniques 
for IO. Rumelt et al. (1991) showed as well that commitment games in IO are those involving 
investment, in specific assets and excess capacity, research and development with and without 
spillovers, horizontal mergers and financial structure. Commitment and reputation are topics 
in Industrial Organization which have been tackled by game theory. Reputation has the 
internal focus on the description of relationships within the firm, and the collection of 
employee beliefs and reputations can be called its ‘culture’. Siotis (1999) and Gersbach and 
Schmutzler (1999) developed game theoretical models for FDI spillovers in two firms and 
two country settings and in geographic clustering of activities. All these statements about 
game theory in IO are clearly applicable for an international business lens. In International 
Business research, the treatment of knowledge spillovers has touched on the Industrial 
Organization literature and showed its applicability to MNE topics in International Business 
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(see Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers, 2007). There is even more of a potential for IB when 
considering commitment, reputation and internal relationships in MNEs. 
 
Camerer (1991) showed how the strengths of Game Theory could benefit strategic 
management. He argued that Game Theory was useful to provide a taxonomy of interactive 
situations and he postulated that game theoretic reasoning can be defended as a mathematical 
shortcut that is used by theorists to figure out where adaptive players will end up. He 
concluded in his paper that recent game theory (post-1970s) does not neglect dynamics, 
pregame communication, and it does not require the players to see the world in the same way.  
 
Rubinstein (1991) emphasized that Game Theory is at once abstract and concrete.  
‘Thus, if a game in the formal sense has any coherent interpretation, it has to be 
understood to include explicit data on the player’s reasoning processes. 
Alternatively, we should add more detail to the description of these reasoning 
procedures. We are attracted to Game Theory because it deals with the mind. 
Incorporating psychological elements which distinguish our minds from 
machines will make Game Theory even more exciting and certainly more 
meaningful.’ (Rubinstein, 1991, p. 923) 
 
Rubinstein’s interpretation shows a way forward for International Business scholars in terms 
of using Game Theory to analyze interactions in multinationals, and to analyze the way that 
minds work. Particularly useful here would be the creation of cultural models of the mind. 
Such cultural cognitive schemes need to be investigated more closely in a globalized world, 
where learning is important. 
 
Just as Industrial Organization and Information Economics benefited from the application of 
Game Theory as a rigorous treatment of their issues in a logical way, so International 
Business can benefit from Game Theory.  
 
2.4. Game Theory in International Business: A Research Agenda 
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Game Theory can be applied to International Business topics via agency theory, 
contract/incentive theory, and bargaining/auction theory in a clear and structured approach. 
Using Buckley’s (2002) new research agenda for International Business, we can highlight the 
potential utility of applying Game Theory to topics of pressing concern for International 
Business. Buckley put forward the following topics:  
 
‘1. Can we explain the sequence of entry as major players in the world economy 
(Great Britain, US, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Korea, China)?  
2. Why are different forms of company organization characteristic of cultural 
backgrounds?  
3. In what empirical measures can we identify trends to (or away from) globalization?  
4. Challenges to global capitalism’ (Buckley, 2002, p. 371).  
 
Below we give examples of these key International Business topics against the four 
fundamental equilibrium concepts in Game Theory introduced earlier.   
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma as static complete information games. Partner selection in international 
alliances often deals with co-operation and conflict. In cases where previous experience with 
each other exists, these partners will have a complete information situation and the Nash 
Equilibrium concept can be applied. International business policies between different 
countries or between multinationals and host governments are an ideal arena to which the 
Nash Equilibrium concept can be applied, too. Additionally, different forms of organization 
with different cultural backgrounds can be set up as a static complete information game and 
refined in the next stages. 
 
Dynamic complete information games. Knowledge spillovers, negotiations in multinational 
firms and with host countries, can be modeled within the complete information scenarios 
between the players, with a sequential equilibrium. Entry games of new players in a market 
are ideally positioned to show dynamic games with complete information - thus Buckley’s 
(2002) call to examine the sequence of entry of major players can be usefully responded to 
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with the concept of dynamic complete information games. The sub-game perfect equilibrium 
concept deals with an evolutionary perspective under complete information. 
 
Static incomplete information games. A range of information asymmetries in International 
Business, for instance between MNE headquarters (HQs) and subsidiaries, and between 
expatriate and local employees show elements of uncertainty due to differences in cultural, 
organizational and legal backgrounds. The adoption of agency models would help to develop 
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for uncertainties about preferences. Moral hazard, and adverse 
selection problems in International Business occur and these can be tackled from a corporate 
governance or contracting perspective. Buckley’s research agenda could be leading towards 
tackling uncertainty about the future major players in a globalized world in connection with 
hidden information and action problems. 
 
Dynamic incomplete information games. The most complex problems of dynamics of 
information asymmetries can be found in MNEs and their subsidiary relationships. The 
evolutionary perspective in combination with uncertainty about the preferences of the players 
apply in an international alliance and cultural aspects of learning and adapting to new ways of 
organizing in MNEs and Emerging Market MNEs. On an international political level, many 
agreements between countries and MNEs are based on uncertainties on both sides and involve 
an important time dimension. Climate change and corruption issues would fall into this 
category as well.  
 
The following table summarizes the key areas for future research using Game Theory.  
 
************** 
Insert Table 3: Future Research for International Business Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
************** 
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Overall, strategic international business interactions will benefit from either being game 
theoretically modeled or being empirically tested. The inclusion of a theoretically 
underpinned empirical research in International Business would contribute to a rigorous 
agenda and a stronger field.  
 
3. An Example for the Application of Game Theory to International Business 
 
This section deals with an application of game theory to a current international problem of 
MNE-subsidiary relationship derived from state of the art problems in the IB literature 
(Buckley, 2002). International business problems occur due to the geographical, 
organizational and cultural distance between the players and the different resources, 
production and development levels. The uncertainty about crucial trade and interaction issues 
between the players offers an ideal application of dynamic incomplete information game 
theory. We therefore choose to consider an MNE-subsidiary problem in International 
Business research which is created by the geographical and cultural distance between the 
players in an MNE – the HQ and subsidiaries. Uncertainty about the expertise and experience 
level of the host country employees needs to be tackled. We assume that there is the 
possibility to offer contracts for labor in a market which has a similar level of expertise in 
marketing or technology. There is an assumption that local staff will do better in the 
subsidiary, if they were exposed to international experience previously either through 
education or work experience. We would therefore like to assume that the subsidiary will 
have lower costs of adjustment to a multi-cultural environment, if the manager knows the 
culture of the MNE HQ. The players rely on signals to know whether they are in a stable 
relationship which would otherwise become costly in case of misunderstandings. The 
international signaling game combines incomplete information about the type of the 
subsidiary staff. This means the host firm employees could either have low experience levels 
and would need to learn about the MNE culture which could result in costly training, 
misunderstandings and conflict. On the other hand, the workforce and management of the 
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subsidiary could have been exposed to the culture of the MNE through education and work 
experience. We are therefore choosing international experience as a productive signal in the 
set-up of MNE-subsidiary relationships. This would mean that we have the MNE offering a 
contract based on the years of international experience to the employees of the subsidiary. 
This scenario is particularly relevant for emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) going into 
markets which have so far not been explored by MNEs from the Triad Region or MNEs from 
the Triad Region going to emerging markets. Uncertainty about the employee relationships in 
MNEs can thus be captured in a multi-person decision-making scenario with strategic 
interaction. 
 
Gintis (2009) described the generic signaling game in a clear and useful manner which would 
fit for our purposes. In a signaling game the first player to move has a type that is revealed to 
player 2 through a special signal. Player 2 will then respond with an action. The payoffs of 
these two players are then a function of the type and the action. The signaling game uses three 
players such as the player 1, player 2 and Nature. Nature is a dummy player which begins the 
game by choosing the type T or state of affairs from a set with a probability. Player 1 
observes the signal, but player 2 does not. Then, player 1 sends a signal to player 2 who 
chooses an action based on the signal. This sequence of events shows how easily game 
theoretical thinking can be applied to real-life issues. We consider first the mathematical 
notation and then the application to the IB problem.  
 
Let us consider the following international signaling game 
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combinations of player i’s signal at stage t, as a function of the past history of actions and 
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i SC and u, specifies player i’s utility payoff as a 
function of all actions and signals (in ))
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t
j SC . The time horizon T 
looks at two stages t=1,2 and 
t
iC is the choice of incentive schemes I dependent on the 
signal 
t
iS which is years of international experience y in our case. The probability 
distribution 
tp considers the probability that the agent chooses her contracts based on the 
signals of years of international experience - therefore )( INTExINTEx yIpp  . The 
utility payoffs are dealt with in the following sections and we can consider 
};{ LocMNEi uuu  as a function dependent on the history of actions and signals.  
 
Proposition 1: If a MNE considers a manager of the host country as subsidiary 
manager, then the contract offered I(yMNE) should be based on the agent’s years 
of international experience in MNEs with HQs in Europe, US, Japan or emerging 
market. 
 
For our game, we have the rules defined as follows: Starting with players, we have N={PMNE, 
ALocal}, the MNE as principal who is risk-neutral, and an agent ALoc who is a local firm or 
subsidiary employe. The agent ALoc will be offered contracts ILoc and may either accept or 
reject. If we consider the MNE offering incentives based on an international experience signal 
according to years educated or worked abroad, then we need to consider the subsidiary to 
provide a signal of low experience or high experience level. Since this is the ex ante stage of a 
contractual setting, this special game could provide a solution to contractual uncertainties in 
the set-up phase of MNE-subsidiary relationships. In terms of incentives, many ways of 
offering are possible. We consider incentives to encourage co-operation (Holmstrom, 1979; 
Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984; Geringer and Woodcock, 1995; Campbell, 1997; Levin, 2003; 
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Andreoni et al. 2003, Ott, 2006). The outcome of the game is either a pooling equilibrium or 
separating equilibrium which are both part of the Perfect Bayes’ equilibrium (PBE) concept. 
In the appendix the mathematical solutions to our problem are presented, whereas the game 
tree and the intuitive results for IB problems can be seen in this section.  
 
Proposition 2. If there are the pooling and the separating equilibria, then the 
former occurs when both types pretend to be a low type and the latter is 
advantageous if both types have incentive compatible outcomes. It would not pay 
a low type to pretend to be a high type and vice versa. In some cases, a low 
experience type might pretend to be a high type to get the higher payment. Thus, 
the incentive schemes may have to be developed so that it is difficult to lie about 
one’s type and truth-telling becomes a dominant strategy.  
 
The two propositions are mathematically dealt with in the appendix as proofs, whereas the 
game tree shows the moves of the players in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
 
*********** 
Figure 1: Game tree of the Signaling Game in MNE with host’s experience levels 
*********** 
 
 
The pooling equilibrium reflects that a subsidiary agent would like to pretend to be a high 
type agent (even so he might not have the experience level), which would result in a higher 
payment to compensate for his experience (Scenario 2) or to be a low type while actually 
being a high type agent (Scenario 3) in order to benefit from training for instance. The 
following two pooling scenarios are dealt with to show the different motivations behind the 
moves of the players and the resulting ways to move to equilibrium behavior due to the 
incentives offered. 
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Scenario 2 (Low Type pretends to have experience to get higher payment): If the local agent 
pretends to be of high type, the efforts and costs will be expected to be higher as well. This 
would be very costly for a low type, since the high type would get paid according to his 
ability.  
Scenario 3 (High Type pretends to have less experience to get training): Pretending to be a 
low type would lead to lower payment, but support in terms of training as the only incentive 
to pretend to be of low type. There might be other reasons for pretending to be of low type 
which is particularly relevant in collective cultures when the group interest might be 
jeopardized.  
 
Overall, this means that high type agents would prefer to get paid according to years of 
experience, since the costs are related to their experience level. This is more beneficial than 
pretending to have less experience and getting a lower payment while the costs are still the 
same. Whereas, a low type should prefer to get paid according to their experience level, since 
in the higher payment case the effort level will be expected to be higher anyway.  
 
In a separating equilibrium both types of agents are required and encouraged to tell the truth 
due to the design of the incentive scheme. 
Scenario 1: It pays off to be a low type and reveal the years of experience for a low type, 
since the disutility of effort is beneficial for the low type.  
Scenario 4: Shows that a high type with a lot of international experience would not benefit 
from behaving as a low type.  The Mathematical Appendix deals with the combination of 
incentive schemes and shows a MNE-subsidiary signaling game. 
 
We can follow the model and use costs of experience and disutility of efforts. Given the 
different players in a MNE, let us now present the following table in which the subsidiary is 
player 1 and the MNE HQ is player 2 with their respective strategies and equilibria. The 
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Table 4 shows how the years of experience influence the contracts offered by the MNE as a 
result of the pooling and separating equilibria (mathematically analyzed in the appendix). 
 
************** 
Insert Table 4 here: MNE-subsidiary signaling outcomes 
************* 
 
The design of the relevant contracts and incentive schemes leads to the revelation about the 
type of players in a MNE-subsidiary relationship. The transfer into an international business 
arena helps to show the logic and the solution behind those dilemmas and tensions in MNE 
scenarios. We were able to see that with an incomplete information scenario and a dynamic 
approach, we are giving a theoretical underpinning for empirical research. Furthermore, from 
an evolutionary perspective found in Gintis (2009), these problems can as well be solved with 
evolutionary game theory which would have strong implications for IB research.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has shown that referring only to the Prisoner’s Dilemma when talking about Game 
Theory and International Business is not enough. Besides the Nash Equilibrium which shows 
co-operation and conflict in a static and complete information setting, there are three more 
game theoretical equilibrium concepts which contribute to the strength of game theoretical 
research in many disciplines and fields: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (dynamic complete 
information games), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (static incomplete information games) and 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concepts (dynamic incomplete information games). This paper 
has used the four equilibrium concepts to position the seminal work in Game Theory, to 
revisit the game theoretical work in International Business and to suggest a future research 
agenda for Game Theory in International Business.  
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The paper dealt with the criticism often put forward when Game Theory is concerned. It 
rebutted the general misconceptions and criticism by showing the advantages and strengths 
from renowned scholars in the field of game theory, industrial organization, evolutionary 
economics, strategic management and international business itself. IB scholars have used 
game theory to show strategic and cultural interactions in MNEs, IJVs, between MNEs and 
governments which emphasized the applicability to IB problems. Game Theory has not found 
its support in a wider circle due to some misconceptions which this paper has hoped to dispel.  
 
A future research agenda put forward by IB scholars was combined with a game theoretical 
treatment of a signaling game of MNE-subsidiary relationships in which signaling is an 
important factor to achieve an optimal solution. The propositions of the models are analyzed 
in pooling and separating equilibria which have as an important finding that the international 
experience of the players is a relevant signal for the stability in an MNE. The analysis focused 
on a factor which has been so far not very much theoretically explored. There would be a lot 
of potential for empirical investigations into the strategic HQ-subsidiary relationships when it 
comes to self-interest and cooperation. The propositions show that the signals of the 
subsidiary sent to the HQ can lead to either a pooling or separating equilibrium when the host 
player has an interest to pretend to be either a different (lying) type or the true type. The HQ 
can develop incentive schemes which are a response to the signal. The design of incentive 
schemes in IB is here considered as dependent on international experience which is important 
for an MNE.  
 
One limitation of the paper is that we have based our model on a hypothetical problem 
derived from the IB research agendas. An empirical test, however, would be outside of the 
scope of the paper. Future research could actually use data and analyze it on an abstract game 
theoretical level, but also apply the game theoretical and contractual insights of an abstract 
model to data collected in international business settings. Game Theory offers many useful 
concepts to apply to the wealth of empirical data in the laboratory of International Business.  
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Our contribution is to point to future research which combines a game theoretical analysis 
with empirical investigations to benefit from a mixed methods approach and to come up with 
a rigorous treatment of problems in international business. International Business would 
clearly benefit from a game theoretical perspective on issues of pressing current relevance. 
Problems of strategic interactions, co-operation and conflict between countries, MNEs, HQs 
and subsidiaries as well as individuals of different cultural backgrounds, are all multi-person 
decision-making scenarios ideally suited for the application of Game Theory. The 
uncertainties in international business can be dealt with via incomplete information games 
and evolutionary issues can be dealt with via dynamic games. In order to fully benefit from 
the strong theoretical tool that is Game Theory, the field of International Business would need 
to accept Game Theory’s approach towards the role of reasoning and to modeling interaction 
between multiple parties, cultures, organizational and knowledge levels.  
 
To return to Camerer (1991) and his call, two decades ago, for an engagement by Strategic 
Management scholars with Game Theory, it is worth noting that Game Theory has now 
become well-established in Strategic Management. This field of management is now much 
stronger for this development. It might therefore be that International Business would 
similarly benefit from a more consistent treatment of strategic interactions between the global 
players in International Business.  
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TABLES:  
 
Table 1: Static and Dynamic Games of Complete and Incomplete Information 
 
 
Games Complete Information Incomplete Information 
 
Static Games Nash Equilibrium 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Nash (1950,1952) 
 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
Harsanyi (1967-8) 
 
Dynamic Games Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Selten (1975) 
  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
Harsanyi (1967-8) 
 
Source: Ott (2006) 
 
Table 2: Situating International Business Applications of Game Theory against Key 
Equilibrium Concepts 
 
Authors in IB (in 
alphabetical order) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Beyond the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma  
Agmon (2003) 
 
Government - MNE  
Akkermans et al (2010) 
 
Cultural Accommodation  
Casson (1994) 
 
 Leader-Follower Model 
Stackelberg 
 
Graham (1998),  
 
MNE - Market Equilibrium 
 
 
Luo (2004) 
 
Government – MNE 
 
 
Ott (2006) 
 
 IJVs and Incomplete 
Information 
 
Rao and Reddy (1996) 
 
 Strategic Alliances 
Sanna-Randaccio and 
Veugelers (2007) 
 
 Knowledge Spill-Overs in 
MNE 
Zhang and Rajagopalan 
(2002) 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
within IJVs 
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Table 3: Future Research for International Business Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Games Complete Information Incomplete Information 
 
Static Games Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Partner Selection in International 
Alliances;  
Global Climate Change Policies 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
 
Information Asymmetries between 
MNE HQs and hosts 
Emerging MNEs 
Dynamic Games Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
 
Industrial Organization Topics, 
Knowledge Spillovers, 
Negotiations in MNEs 
Emerging markets MNEs 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
 
Dynamics of information 
asymmetries in MNE – subsidiary 
relationships 
Emerging markets MNEs 
 
Table 4: Pooling and Separating Equilibria in MNE-subsidiary relationships 
 
 HQ –MNE (Principal) 
Incentive Scheme for low 
experience level (few 
years) 
yMNE < g contract IL(yMNE) 
Incentive Scheme for high 
experience level (many 
years) 
yMNE g for IH(yMNE) 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsidiary 
 
Local Host 
Employee 
(Agent) 
 
 
Low 
experience 
level (few 
years) in case 
of SMEs with 
technology 
Low Local /Low MNE 
Both know that player 1 
needs to learn and player 1 
is telling the truth, since 
the incentive is offered for 
a low type. 
Learning of cultures is at 
the centre with cross-
cultural training facilities 
to be provided for low 
types  
Scenario (1) Separating 
Equilibrium 
 
Low Local/ High MNE 
Local firm does not have a 
lot of international 
knowledge; high costs of 
learning for subsidiary 
employee, but expectation of 
employee is higher than 
what can be delivered – 
short-lived   
Scenario (2) 
Pooling Equilibrium  
 
 
 
High 
experience 
level (many 
years) 
High Local/Low MNE 
MNE offers low incentive 
schemes to someone with 
high experience level; 
MNE gets market access 
and high-skilled labor, but 
does not reciprocate – 
short lived 
Scenario (3) Pooling 
Equilibrium 
 
High Local/High MNE 
  
The high type agent will 
get the incentive scheme 
which fits the expertise 
and costs as well effort 
levels.  
Success –  Case  
Co-operation of both   
Scenario (4) 
Separating Equilibrium 
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FIGURES: 
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Figure 1: Game tree of the Signaling Game in MNE with host’s experience levels 
 
*Nature: is a Dummy Player which knows the type of player 1 and player 1 learns their type 
from Nature which randomizes the choices. 
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GLOSSARY OF GAME THEORETICAL TERMS (Camerer 1991, 151-152): 
 
Nash Equilibrium: An NE occurs when each player’s action is rational given the other 
player’s equilibrium action.  
Pooling Equilibrium: occurs when players with different privately-known information or 
utilities (different ‘types’) choose the same action;  
Separating Equilibrium: occurs when they choose different actions. 
Rationalizable strategies: are those which are optimal, for some beliefs about the choices 
others are likely to make, provided one does not expect others to choose a dominated strategy.  
Dominated Strategy: is a strategy which is never better and sometimes worse than another 
strategy. 
Dominant Strategy: is a strategy which is better than another strategy. 
Coordination Games: are those games with multiple equilibria – the battle of the sexes is an 
example – in which players strive to agree on one equilibrium because out-of-equilibrium 
responses hurt everyone.  
Reputation: in game theory is the common perception of another player’s privately-known 
type. 
Trigger Strategy: in a repeated game is a strategy which chooses an action that punishes 
another player for breaking an unspoken agreement, tit-for-tat is one well-known example.  
Folk Theorem: is a group of theorems showing that in repeated games, virtually any outcome 
can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
 
Incentives and signaling 
 
Suppose we have flat fee payments for two types (low or high quality level), the incentive is 
independent of any kind of performance or other variable factor. Thus, payment for low 
quality may be IL = I and IH = 2I for the high type. A refinement of contracts and a method of 
taking into consideration the ex ante judgment of the agent’s quality can be applied by 
offering incentives dependent on years of experience in international ventures.  
 
To start with a signaling problem, the agent might have gained multinational enterprise 
(MNE) experience through various international assignments. The payment offered could, 
therefore, be based on the years of such international experience. The agent might be a low-
type or a high-type of quality. Since the economy can be divided into a fraction of firms being 
of superior type, the contracts may be designed to target these differences in types. The 
contract IHCN, incentive contract for host country nationals (HCN), could therefore have the 
following nature that it is dependent on years of experience in the MNE culture yMNE: IHCN = 
I(yMNE).  
 
Lemma 1: The distinction between the two types can be made by introducing a 
cut-off point experience level g such as yMNE < g stands for the low quality type 
and yMNE g for the high type. There is ],[ ggg   
 
 IHCN
 = I(yMNE)   years of MNE experience where g is a critical value as  
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Turning to the case of a scheme based on MNE experience, the principal could develop a flat 
fee IHCN
 = I for the low type and IHCN
 = 2I for the high type, therefore IHCN
 is independent of 
years of international experience.  
 
Proposition 1: If a MNE considers a manager of the host country as subsidiary 
manager, then the contract offered I(yMNE) should be based on the agent’s years 
of international experience in MNEs with HQs in Europe, US, Japan or emerging 
market. 
 
In the case of the HQ offering incentives to the local manager (HCN) who could have 
experience in MNEs in order to provide the subsidiary with knowledge about international 
transactions and to make a successful contribution to an international business venture, we 
have the following incentive scheme 
 
Since the principal can choose the agent based on his critical value k in relation to the 
experience level, the case will be analogous to the scenario above.   
 
Let us consider the two types of agents and the contracts offered by the principal. Thus, we 
have the following payoffs for the agents and the individual rationality constraints 
 
)()( MNEMNEHCN
Sub
HCN
evyIu    or      )()( MNEMNEHCN
Sub
HCN
ycyIu   (2) 
where 
0SubMNEu  is IR constraint 
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Since )()( MNEHCN ycev   is considered as disutility of effort and costs of experience 
which means that the managers have lower costs and efforts when they have higher 
experience levels. A key assumption is that cH(y) < cL(y), it is more costly for a low quality 
type to achieve a given experience level because a low type has to put in more effort. More 
years of experience will induce low effort costs. Now, consider )( MNEyI  as value of the 
marginal product. If  is increasing with y then the productivity increases with experience 
)()( MNELMNEH yIyI  .  
 
Another type of linear contract can be found in connection with royalties and fixed payments. 
The principal offers a high fixed payment plus a low royalty depending on the output or 
performance for the low quality agent and vice versa. Agents have to disclose their skills by 
choosing a contract. Since it is possible to lie about ones qualities, the contracts have to be 
designed in a way that they fulfill participation and the incentive compatibility constraint such 
that it is difficult to accept a contract which is not appropriate. Under the assumption that 
truth-telling is a dominant strategy, the revelation principle can be introduced for problems of 
signaling.  
 
Proposition 2. If there are the pooling and the separating equilibria, then the 
former occurs when both types pretend to be a low type and the latter is 
advantageous if both types have incentive compatible outcomes. It would not pay 
a low type to pretend to be a high type and vice versa. In some cases, a low 
experience type might pretend to be a high type to get the higher payment. Thus, 
the incentive schemes may have to be developed so that it is difficult to lie about 
one’s type and truth-telling becomes a dominant strategy.  
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Since these schemes are optional, the menus of contracts are applied to incomplete 
information games in the start-up phase of a MNE-subsidiary relationship between players 
without former business experience. These cases occur especially in dyadic country 
combinations, e.g. one parent is in a less developed or developing country with strict host 
government rules and the other one from an industrialized country, desiring market access.  
 
Pooling Equilibrium. Suppose now that the years of MNE experience are productive, 
FryyI MNEL )(  and FryyI MNEH  2)( , in which F is a nonnegative constant. The 
value added increases with y, but an additional unit of higher experience adds twice as much 
to the productivity of a high type, compared to a low type. The cost functions are such that 
)()( MNELMNEH ycyc  . If we assume that low types would pretend to be a high type because 
they prefer to get higher payment even if the costs are higher, than we have to consider the 
following. 
 
Both types choose yMNE years of experience, with the critical value to be determined. Each 
agent is paid the same incentive scheme, the expected value of marginal product when 
everyone sets y MNE = g. 
 
Let pH be the probability that the agent is of the high type. The expected productivity at yMNE 
= g is 
))(1()2()()1()( rgprgpgIpgIp HHLHHH   (8) 
 
The incentive scheme offered by the principal could be therefore: 
If yMNE < g, the low type agents get payment ryMNE 
If yMNE  g, the high type agents get payments ))(1()2( rgprgp HH    
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Separating Equilibrium. Suppose the high type agent obtains more experience than the low 
type. The low type agents would prefer to set their years of experience on a high level to get 
better payments. Therefore, everyone would choose a higher number of years.  
 
Separation requires that the agents’ choice reveals their type. Thus, an agent choosing 
L
MNEy  
will receive a payment of 
L
MNEry  and an agent choosing 
H
MNEy  will receive 
H
MNEry2 . The 
incentive compatibility constraints (ICC) for the separating equilibrium are therefore: 
)()()()(2 LMNEH
L
MNE
H
MNEH
H
MNE ycyrycyr   (9) 
)()(2)()( HMNEL
H
MNE
L
MNEL
L
MNE ycyrycyr     (10) 
 
 
 
